Abstract. We study a recently proposed design approach of Feistel ciphers which employs optimal diffusion mappings across multiple rounds. This idea was proposed by Shirai and Shibutani at FSE2004, and the technique enables to improve the immunity against either differential or linear cryptanalysis (but not both). In this paper, we present a theoretical explanation why the new design using three different matrices achieves the better immunity. In addition, we are able to prove conditions to improve the immunity against both differential and linear cryptanalysis. As a result, we show that this design approach guarantees at least R(m+1) active S-boxes in 3R consecutive rounds (R ≥ 2) where m is the number of S-boxes in a round. By using the guaranteed number of active S-boxes, we compare this design approach to other well-known designs employed in SHARK, Rijndael, and MDS-Feistel ciphers. Moreover, we show interesting additional properties of the new design approach.
Introduction
A Feistel structure is one of the most widely used and best studied structures for the design of block ciphers. It was first proposed by H. Feistel in 1973; subsequently the structure was adopted in the well-known block cipher DES [5, 6] . The main advantage of the Feistel structure is its involution property, which provides flexible designs of the underlying F-functions. During the 30 year history of modern block ciphers, extensive studies have been made on Feistel structure [8, 11, 14] . Currently, many well-known block ciphers, e.g. Camellia [1] , Misty [10] , RC6 [13] , Twofish [15] , employed the design of Feistel structures.
Recently, Shirai and Shibutani proposed a novel design approach of Feistel ciphers based on the concept of optimal diffusion mappings [18] . An optimal diffusion is a linear function with maximum branch number; the concept of optimal diffusion is used in the design of AES and many other cryptographic primitives [2, 4, 12, 15] . From their empirical analytic results, the immunity against either differential and linear cryptanalysis (but not both) would be strengthened significantly if the linear diffusion layer of the Feistel structure satisfies special optimal diffusion conditions across multiple rounds. In this way difference cancellation in the Feistel structure caused by a small number of active S-boxes will not occur. This result opened a new line of research on the Feistel structure. A theoretical proof of the effectiveness of the proposed design and a solution to improve the immunity against both differential and linear cryptanalysis remained unsolved.
In this paper, we will call the "Optimal Diffusion Mappings across Multiple Rounds" design approach of Feistel ciphers the ODM-MR design. Our contribution is that we first give a theoretical explanation of the effectiveness of the ODM-MR design implied by Shirai and Shibutani. Second, we found new conditions and proofs to improve the immunity of both differential and linear cryptanalysis. Let m be the number of S-boxes in an F-function. As a result, by combining previous and novel conditions, we finally show that Feistel ciphers with the ODM-MR design guarantees R(m+1) active S-boxes in 3R consecutive rounds for R ≥ 2.
In order to further investigate the properties of the ODM-MR design, we compare the ratio of guaranteed active S-boxes to all employed S-boxes of the ODM-MR design to other design approaches employed in MDS-Feistel, SHARK and AES/Rijndael. All of them use optimal diffusion mappings in their linear diffusion. Consequently, in 128-bit block and 8-bit S-box settings, we obtain a limit of 0.371 for the active S-box ratio of ODM-MR design when the number r of rounds goes to infinity, which means that we can guarantee 37.1% active S-boxes with this design strategy. This result is apparently better than MDSFeistel's ratio of 0.313. Moreover we show that for the number of S-boxes in an F-function and the round number go to infinity, the converged ratio of ODM-MR is 0.333. This is better than Rijndael-type diffusion layer's ratio 0.250. From these limit values, we can conclude that ODM-MR performs better than the other approaches in certain settings. This paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we introduce some definitions used in this paper. Previous works including ODM-MR design approach are shown in Sect. 3. We prove in Sect. 4 the theorems regarding ODM-MR as our main contribution. In Sect. 5, we discuss the new design by presenting some numerical values. Finally Sect. 6 concludes the paper. The method to construct the concrete Feistel ciphers with ODM-MR design is proposed in Appendix A.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we treat the typical Feistel structure, which is called a balanced Feistel structure. It is defined as follows [14] .
b be a b-bit block cipher (for b even) with a k-bit key. Let r be the number of rounds, k i ∈ {0, 1} k be the k -bit round key provided by a key scheduling algorithm and x i ∈ {0, 1} b/2 be intermediate data, and let
be the F-function of the i-th round. The encryption and decryption algorithm of a balanced Feistel Cipher E are defined as follows
where msb x (y) (lsb x (y)) represents the most (least) significant x-bit of y.
Then we define SP-type F-functions which are a special type of F-function constructions [7, 17] . n → {0, 1} n be the j-th S-box in the i-th round, and let S i : {0, 1} b/2 → {0, 1} b/2 be the function generated by concatenating m S-boxes in the i-th round. Let
b/2 be the linear Boolean function. Then SP-type F-functions are defined as An (m, n, r)-SPMFC is defined as an r-round Feistel cipher with SP-type round function using m n-bit S-boxes, and for which all s i,j , P i are bijective. An mn × mn matrix M i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) over GF (2) denotes a matrix representation of a linear Boolean function P i of (m, n, r)-SPMFC.
We also give definitions of bundle weight and branch number [4] .
kn , where x is represented as a concatenation of n-bit values as
n , then the bundle weight w n (x) of x is defined as
ln . The branch number of θ is defined as
{w n (a) + w n (θ(a))} .
Remark 1.
The maximum branch number is B(θ) = l +1. If a linear function has a maximum branch number, it is called an optimal diffusion mapping [2] . It is known that an optimal diffusion mapping can be obtained from maximum distance separable codes known as MDS codes [4] .
Previous Work
The precise estimation of the lower bound of the number of active S-boxes of block ciphers has been known as one of the practical means to evaluate ciphers, because this lower bound can be used to calculate the upper bound of the differential characteristic probability or the linear characteristic probability [1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 17] . Shimizu has shown a conjectured lower bound of the number of differentially and linearly active S-boxes for certain (m, n, r)-SPMFC block ciphers, in which a unique optimal diffusion mapping is repeatedly used in all F-functions [16] . Since such optimal diffusion mappings can be obtained from a generation matrix of an MDS code, we call the design MDS-Feistel [2, 4, 18] . Shimizu showed the following formula.
Conjecture 1. Let A be an mn × mn matrix over GF (2) of an optimal diffusion mapping with maximum branch number m + 1. Let E be an (m, n, r)-SPMFC block cipher and all matrices of diffusion layers are represented by the unique matrix
Then a lower bound of the differentially and linearly active S-boxes of E is conjectured as
In Table 1 , the columns indicated by 'M1' show the conjectured lower bounds of number of active S-boxes, and the data of the conjectured values are plotted on the left side of Fig. 3 . This simple relation between the round number and the guaranteed number of active S-boxes is considered as a useful tool for evaluating similar kinds of block cipher designs. While this conjecture has not been proved, empirically, it has been partially confirmed [18] .
Recently, at FSE 2004, Shirai and Shibutani proposed a novel design approach to improve the minimum number of active S-boxes of Feistel ciphers by employing optimal diffusion mappings across multiple round functions, the ODM-MR design approach [18] . By carefully analyzing the difference cancellations, they found the following properties:
, is an optimal diffusion mapping, the minimum number of differentially active S-boxes is increased from an MDS-Feistel cipher.
-Additionally, if each concatenation of three matrices M j , M j+2 and M j+4 for all possible j, denoted by [M j |M j+2 |M j+4 ], is an optimal diffusion mapping, the minimum number of differentially active S-boxes is increased further than when only satisfying the above conditions on two matrices. -Even if the number of concatenated matrices is larger than 3, no explicit gain of the number of active S-boxes has been observed in their simulations.
These results imply that by avoiding a linear correlation between F-functions in round (i, i+2) or rounds (i, i+2, i+4), the ODM-MR construction guarantees more active S-boxes.
In Table 1 , the columns indicated by 'D' show the result of the improved minimum number of differentially active S-boxes when every concatenated matrix of three matrices [M i |M i+2 |M i+4 ] is an optimal diffusion mapping. The graph of the corresponding values are shown on the left side of Fig. 2 .
This result opened a new line of research on developing more efficient Feistel ciphers. On the other hand a theoretical justification of the gain of the proposed construction and an explicit method to improve the immunity against both differential and linear cryptanalysis remained unsolved.
Proofs of Effectiveness of the ODM-MR Design
In this section, we provide the first proofs for the effectiveness of the ODM-MR design using three different matrices. We also show an additional condition and some proofs in order to improve the lower bound of linearly active S-boxes by using two different matrices. Our main contribution is to show the following corollary which presents a simple relation between the number of rounds and the guaranteed numbers of active S-boxes in the ODM-MR design. In the corollary, note that t M denotes the transpose matrix of a matrix M .
Corollary 1.
Let E be a (m,n,r)-SPMFC block cipher where r ≥ 6.
j+2 ] are optimal diffusion mappings for any i, j (1 ≤ i ≤ r − 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 2), respectively, any 3R consecutive rounds (R ≥ 2) in E guarantee at least R(m + 1) differentially and linearly active S-boxes. Fig. 1 illustrates the statement of the corollary. By using the Corollary 1, we can guarantee theoretically arbitrary number of active S-boxes by increasing the number of rounds. Since the corollary can be immediately obtained from two theorems, i.e. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the following two subsections are devoted to the proofs of these theorems. To ease the proofs, we first introduce an additional definition.
Definition 6. Consider a differential characteristic or linear approximation. Let D i and L i denote the number of differentially and linearly active S-boxes in the i-th round, respectively. These values are determined by the difference ∆x i , ∆z i or by the linear mask Γ x i , Γ z i as follows. Remark 2. Note that a given difference characteristic always contains a nonzero input difference, since any (m, n, r)-SPMFC's F-functions are bijective. Hence we obtain the following conditions:
Since a linear approximation always contains a nonzero input mask, we obtain
Proofs for the Lower Bound of Differentially Active S-boxes
In this section we prove Theorem 1; the proof is based on five lemmata. Lemma 1 shows relations between D i of (m, n, r)-SPMFC when every M i is an optimal diffusion mapping. Lemma 1. Let E be an (m, n, r)-SPMFC block cipher. If every M i has maximum branch number m + 1, then E satisfies the following condition (d2).
Proof. From the relation between the differences ∆z i+1 ,∆x i and ∆x i+2 in a 3 consecutive rounds, we obtain the following equation.
Since M i has maximum branch number m + 1 we have
Eq. (2) and the inequality w n (∆x i ) + w n (∆x i+2 ) ≥ w n (∆x i ⊕ ∆x i+2 ) yield (d2).
Remark 3. By combining Remark 2 and (d2), we can obtain additional underlying conditions (d3) and (d4).
Equations (d3) and (d4) mean that if round k has no active S-boxes, any 2 consecutive rounds next to round k always contain more than m + 1 active S-boxes. Next, we show the property of (m, n, r)-SPMFC in which every [M i |M i+2 ] is an optimal diffusion mapping. This is true for the ODM-MR.
Lemma 2. Let E be a (m,n,r)-SPMFC block cipher. If every [M i |M i+2 ] has maximum branch number m + 1, E satisfies the following conditions (d5), (d6).
Proof. From the relation between 5-round differences,
has maximum branch number m + 1, and from Remark 2, we see that w n (∆z i+1 ) = 0 and w n (∆z i+3 ) = 0 will never occur simultaneously, we obtain w n (∆z i+1 ) + w n (∆z i+3 ) + w n (∆x i ⊕ ∆x i+4 ) ≥ m + 1 .
By assuming the cases ∆x i = 0 or ∆x i+4 = 0, we directly obtain (d5) and (d6).
By using the previously obtained conditions (d0)−(d6), we show the following lemma for the guaranteed number of differentially active S-boxes of (m, n, r)-SPMFC.
Lemma 3. Let E be a (m,n,r)-SPMFC block cipher where r ≥ 6. If every [M i |M i+2 ] is an optimal diffusion mapping, then any 6 consecutive rounds in E guarantee at least 2(m + 1) differentially active S-boxes.
Proof. Consider the total number of active S-boxes in 6 consecutive rounds from the i-th round,
From (d3) and (d6), The case of D i+4 = 0 is proven similarly from (d1), (d4) and (d5).
Next, we show the property of an (m, n, r)-SPMFC in which every [M i |M i+2 |M i+4 ] has maximum branch number. This coincides with one of the ODM-MR design.
is an optimal diffusion mapping, then E satisfies the following condition (d7).
Proof. First, from the difference relation in 7 consecutive rounds, we obtain
has maximum branch number, and from Remark 2, w n (∆z i+1 ), w n (∆z i+3 ), and w n (∆z i+5 ) cannot be simultaneously 0, we get that
By assuming ∆x i = 0 and ∆x i+6 = 0, we derive the condition (d7).
From the additional condition (d7), we derive the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let E be a (m,n,r)-SPMFC block cipher where r ≥ 9. If every
] is an optimal diffusion mapping, then any 9 consecutive rounds in E guarantee at least 3(m + 1) differentially active S-boxes.
Proof. Consider the total number of active S-boxes in 9 consecutive rounds, If
From (d3), (d7) and (d4), As a consequence, we have shown that any 9 consecutive rounds of E guarantee at least 3(m + 1) differentially active S-boxes.
We conclude this section with Theorem 1. Let E be an (m, n, r)-SPMFC block cipher where r ≥ 6. If every
] is an optimal diffusion mapping, any 3R consecutive rounds in E guarantees at least R(m + 1) differentially active S-boxes.
Proof. Any integer 3R (R ≥ 2) can be written as 3R = 6k + 9j (k + j ≥ 1, 2k + 3j = R). From lemmata 3 and 5, 6 and 9 consecutive rounds of E guarantee 2(m + 1) and 3(m + 1) differentially active S-boxes, respectively. Therefore, E guarantees k * 2(m+1)+j * 3(m+1) = (2k +3j)(m+1) = R(m+1) differentially active S-boxes.
Proofs for the Lower Bound of Linearly Active S-boxes
In this subsection, we will show the proof of the guaranteed number of linearly active S-boxes of (m, n, r)-SPMFC with ODM-MR design.
i+2 ] is an optimal diffusion mapping for any i, any 3R consecutive rounds in E has at least R(m + 1) linearly active S-boxes.
Proof. From the 3-round linear mask relation,
Then,
i+2 ] has maximum branch number m + 1, and from Remark 2, w n (Γ z i ) and w n (Γ z i+2 ) cannot be simultaneously 0, we obtain
By using the notion of L i , this implies,
This shows that every 3 consecutive rounds guarantees at least m + 1 linearly active S-boxes. Consequently, any 3R consecutive rounds in E guarantees
Finally, by simply combining Theorems 1 and 2, the claimed Corollary 1 follows directly. Appendix A contains example matrices that satisfy the ODM-MR design.
Discussion

Comparison of ODM-MR and MDS-Feistel
To discuss the implications of this new design approach, we show empirical search results for the cases r = 12, m = 4, .., 8. To obtain these results we employed a weight based search method. This approach has been used by Shirai and Shibutani before [18] . Our results are shown in Table 1 . In the table, the values for more than 13-rounds are interpolated by the corollary and Shimizu's conjecture. Note that the simulation results completely match the lower bound values predicted by the corollary, which are denoted by the underlined values. These results show the superiority of ODM-MR design over MDS-Feistel explicitly. Fig. 2 shows graphs of the results in Table 1 
Active S-box Ratio
In this subsection, we compare the ODM-MR approach to other design approaches using the new type of approach. Since we obtained a formal bound for the lower bound of the ODM-MR design approach, we can compare it to other well known design approaches based on the concept of active S-box ratio introduced by Shirai and Shibutani [18] . Let active(r, m) be the number of guaranteed active S-boxes for an r-round cipher which employs m×m diffusion matrices over GF (2 n ) in its diffusion layer. This implies that about 31% of all S-boxes will be active for a very large number of rounds. This limit can be considered as a potentially guaranteed ratio of active S-boxes corresponding to the chosen m. Also, we can take the limit of ratio(r, m) when both r and m tend to infinity, Even though huge r and m are not practical in the real world, the value can be understood as an indicator of the potential efficiency of a particular design strategy. We propose these limits as a reference to evaluate the efficiency of the linear diffusion layer of the cipher and use them to compare ciphers employing different design strategies. The following table contains the convergence values of the "MDS-Feistel" and the"ODM-MR" design. Additionally, the following "Rijndael type" and "SHARK type" design approaches are also evaluated for reference.
Rijndael type: A nm 2 -bit SPN block cipher design whose round function consists of key-addition, m × m parallel n-bit S-boxes, a MixColumn employing m m × m matrices over GF (2 n ) and a ShiftRow operation [4] . SHARK type: A nm-bit SPN block cipher design where m parallel n-bit Sboxes, an m × m matrix over GF (2 n ) are employed [12] . Note that all four designs employ optimal diffusion mappings in their diffusion layers; they have block length of 128 bits with 8-bit S-boxes. The result shows that the ODM-MR approach has the better limit than MDS-Feistel in the 128-bit block setting which is also confirmed by the empirical results in the previous section. We also know that ODM-MR's limit is closer to that of the Rijndael design approach than MDS-Feistel.
Moreover, the limit value of the ODM-MR approach, when both r and m tend to infinity, exceeds that of the Rijndael type construction. This is due to the fact that the ODM-MR approach guarantees a certain number of active S-boxes for 3 consecutive rounds, while the Rijndael-type approach has such a property for 4 consecutive rounds.
The values of SHARK are still the highest, because the design strategy has a 2-round property. However, there seems to be a tradeoff for the implementation cost, as SHARK-type design requires matrices which are twice as large as the matrices in the MDS-Feistel and ODM-MR and four times as large as in the Rijndael approach.
Conclusion
We provide a theoretical motivation for the ODM-MR design. We first give a theoretical reason of ODM-MR, and found additional conditions and proofs to improve the immunity against differential and linear cryptanalysis. As a result, we showed that the ODM-MR design approach guarantees at least R(m + 1) active S-boxes in 3R consecutive rounds (R ≥ 2) where m is the number of Sboxes in a round. This guaranteed number of active S-boxes was compared with the design approach of other well-known designs namely SHARK, Rijndael, and MDS-Feistel ciphers. We were able to show that our design approach outperforms some of the other designs.
